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 The author defines ethnicity as a community which enables a reproduction 
of culture. i.e. a system of moral regulation within communities. Cultural iden-
tity of a community is a means by which it affirms its moral value vis-à-vis 
others. The elements of culture (language, religion, customs, historical legacy) 
serve to an ethnic community for defining borders towards other communities. 
Nationalism (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) makes use of the 
mobilization of ethnic identities. A prominent role in that process is played by 
intellectuals, who have monopoly over cultural production, particularly over the 
imposition and preservation of the language standard.  
 On the background of this theoretical and historical analysis, the author 
highlights the causes of intensive ethno-nationalist conflicts in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
 There is hardly a more high profile political problem in Central and 
Eastern Europe than that of ethnicity; and language is universally inter-
preted as the innermost significance of ethnicity. Much ethnic conflict evi-
dently centres on language. An outsider might conclude that if only lan-
guage issues could be settled - and they seem so obvious and trivial - the 
ethnic tensions that plague the region could be eased. After all, reason-
able people should not really care about low-level difficulties like whether 
a village has monolingual or bilingual street signs. And by the same to-
ken, does it really matter if an ethno-linguistic minority is obliged to learn 
the language of the majority, everybody has to learn the language of the 
state, do they not? 
 The argument to be put forward in this article is that this level of 
analysis misses the underlying dynamics of language, ethnicity and power 
and that while it is possible to find solutions for inter-ethnic tension, the 
true causes of it have first to be identified. This requires a close look at 
exactly what ethnicity is and why language plays such a salient role in 
ethnic self-definitions, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 Much of the conventional analysis begins from the assumption that eth-
nicity is only made political by “artificial” means and that people belong-
ing to different ethnic groups have lived together in peace for centuries, 
implying that if were not for these “artificial” interventions, they would 
continue to do so. This approach misses several points. Indeed, it implies 
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a kind of moral disapproval and says nothing about the dynamics of eth-
nicity, which might actually held in understanding inter-ethnic relations. 
 The clue to a sharper insight into the phenomenon is that ethnicity 
operates simultaneously on several planes, only one of which is political. 
But while in pre-modern societies the political system did not impinge too 
directly on cultures, with coming of modernity it began to do so. This had 
far-reaching consequences for the way in which cultures now had to define 
themselves politically and to respond to the imperatives of political power. 
Culture, politics, society and the way in which they interact have to be 
clarified before some sense is made of what ethnicity does and why. 
 The starting assumption in this argument is that ethnicity is about cul-
tural reproduction1. Those who are members of a cultural community will 
spend much of their lives in sustaining it, nurturing it and gaining the 
approbation of others for their collective attainments. There is a persuasive 
explanation for this. A culture is a system of moral regulation in the 
deepest sense. It seeks to establish a coherent world2 about which a com-
munity can organise itself and draw meanings for and about its own 
existence. 
 How people live, the individual's relationship with the wider world, 
other people included, are structured by their membership of the commu-
nity. The way in which a community is constituted, the precise nature of 
the relationship between the individual and the community - this inevitably 
comes to involve questions of political power - vary from community to 
community. These variations then come to constitute the raw material for 
ethnic conflict, because each community is axiomatically convinced of the 
rightness of its morality and its superiority to all others. In short, each 
and every ethnic community is looking to validate its “moral worth”, its 
standing in the world, in its own eyes and in the eyes of others.3 
 Ethnic groups are, therefore, structured around systems of moral regula-
tion. They define themselves by a wide range of possible means, both in-
ternally and towards the outside world. Anything can play this role of 
marker4 ways of delimiting the external boundary of the community, from 
language, religion, territory or history - to be precise, memory, ie history 
 
  1Pierre Bourdieu. The Field of Cultural Production (Cambridge: Polity, 1993). 
  2On the psychology of coherence see Csaba Pleh, “A narrativumok mint a 
pszichologiai koherenciateremtes eszkozei” [Narratives as instruments for creating 
psychological coherence] Holmi, Vol. 8, No.2 (February 1996), pp. 265-282. 
  3Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985). 
  4On boundaries and markers, see Fredrik Barth (editor), Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries: the Social Organisation of Culture Difference (Bergen/Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1969). 
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as recalled - to banal instruments of reproduction, like dress codes to 
foodstuffs (“we don't eat this because we are Ruritanians”) [“Ruritanian” 
here is a metaphor for any of the ethno-linguistic groups of the region]. 
Crucial to this process is that both explicit and implicit markers are in-
volved. People will adhere to certain ways of doing things without having 
any idea of why - they are then involved in the process of cultural repro-
ductions5. By definition, no one can fully comprehend all the social and 
cultural processes of which they are a part; no one has perfect rationality. 
 Language is widely regarded as the central if not indeed the only 
boundary marker. There is a widespread assumption that a nation, in or-
der that it can call itself a nation, should have its own language. This 
proposition is a misperception, though one that is understandable, given 
that most of the obvious transactions within a collectivity take place 
through the medium of language and the members of the group come to 
regard that medium as theirs alone and as the “natural” means of ex-
pressing their own existence. 
 The role of language as an ethnic marker has been particularly salient 
in Central and Eastern Europe and cultural communities in the region use 
language in this way with great emphasis. There are good reasons for this, 
to be found in the history and social structure of the area. Nationalism 
came to Western Europe first in the 19th century and it was constructed 
around the then existing framework of states and institutions. Essentially 
this meant that the pre-existing system of states, which used loyalty to the 
monarch as the principal cement, received a new legitimation, that of na-
tionhood. Nationhood was the medium through which political power, the 
monopoly of the aristocracy until then, could be devolved to other social 
strata, because it offered a set of loyalties cohesive enough to ensure that 
the newly empowered groups would not secede. In this sense, the coming 
of nationalism was expressly democratic. 
 In Central and Eastern Europe the new doctrine was received with en-
thusiasm as a way of challenging the power of the ruling empires and to 
launch the process of modernisation. This was understood as meaning 
reaching the standards of power, economic well-being and above all moral 
worth, meaning the power of cultural attraction6 that was seen in the 
West. The reception of nationalism, the newly developed doctrine of 
popular enfranchisement and empowerment, was particularly welcome to a 
newly arisen social stratum - the secular intellectuals. The Enlightenment 
brought into being a sizeable group of individuals who saw as their raison 
d'etre the generation of new ideas, of new means of interpretation and 
 
  5Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: SAGE, 1995). 
  6Isaiah Berlin's “bent twig” argument is directly relevant in this context. See his 
“The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism” The Crooked Timber of Humanity 
(London: John Murray, 1990). 
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the shaping of social and cultural values, independently of church and 
monarch. 
 In the West, the activities of the intellectuals took place in a relatively 
confined arena, against the competition of other groups, like the rising en-
trepreneurial classes, the remnants of the aristocracy, the new bureauc-
racies and the industrial working classes as the 19th century wore on. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, however, these strata were weak to non-exis-
tent, so that the intellectuals had the field largely to themselves. This was 
a key moment - the encounter between the new intellectuals and the 
equally new doctrine of nationalism. The encounter was highly successful 
and they have never looked back.7 
 The central activity of intellectuals is their use and control of language 
and in Central and Eastern Europe they acquired a near-monopoly. They 
were directly involved not merely in interpretation and evaluation, but 
through their formulation of the new national languages and the reformu-
lation of the national community, they gained access to authority and pres-
tige without parallel. No longer involved in the supervised legitimation of 
dynastic or ecclesiastical power, they were largely unconstrained and could 
pursue moral legislation, in the definitions of future and past and in the 
elaboration of the lifeworld, thanks to their control of the language. 
 From the outset, Central and East European intellectuals found them-
selves having to define cultural communities from rather limited raw mate-
rials and having to argue their case in political as well as cultural terms, 
given that the ruling empires were looking to homogenise their populations 
in the name of greater efficiency and imperial loyalty. Thus from the out-
set, questions of language and literacy acquired a political dimension in 
Central and Eastern Europe that they did not have in the West.8 
 The arguments used to legitimate the bid for power began as a mix-
ture of legal, historical and political claims, but it was soon evident that 
these propositions would not provide the popular base needed to mount a 
challenge serious enough to induce the ruling dynasties to cede power. In 
this connection, the example of the French Revolution was infectious. To 
mobilise the people, the people had first to be defined. Given the em-
phasis on language that was the stock-in-trade of the intellectuals, coupled 
with the weakness of other means of mobilisation, “the people” were 
those who spoke the same language. This was perfectly logical, for condi-
tions were unlike revolutionary France, where all the subjects of the Kings 
of France were simply “citizens”. 
 
  7Zygmunt Bauman, “Intellectuals in East-Central Europe: Continuity and 
Change” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 1, No.2 (Spring 1987), pp. 162-
186. 
  8Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
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 There were, as a matter of fact, some attempts to construct political 
nations on a geographical rather than a cultural-linguistic base - Bohemi-
anism, the idea that all the inhabitants of Bohemia regardless of their cul-
ture and language, constituted a nation, was one of these. It failed, be-
cause it lacked the dynamism that derives from an authentically felt sense 
of community. Language was the factor that worked. 
 The implication is that where the state has not carried out the process 
of civic homogenisation, as it had in the West, culture as embodied in 
language was a much more effective basis for political power than conti-
guity. The devolving of power on all could only take place if those with 
power could be secure that the newly empowered would use it responsibly. 
Thus in Central and Eastern Europe, the use of language as a primary 
instrument of mobilisation - the one that intellectuals handled the most 
readily - has left an indelible mark on politics, on the cultural community 
and on relations with other cultures. 
 The role of language in the region assumed a saliency, therefore, be-
cause it was the most effective political resource and because the gap be-
tween the existing distribution of political power and culture was too 
great. The integration of culture and power had not taken place, as it 
had in the West, nor indeed had the integration of political power and 
language. This made the task of the mobilisers that much more complex. 
Furthermore, not only did people have to mobilised to become conscious 
of their cultural community, but the principal marker of the community - 
language - had still to be defined. 
 Hence language became both instrument and aim. Those who spoke or 
could be made to speak a particular language - a national, hence a politi-
cally legitimate language - were the usable material of the nation, its 
members in whose name power could be demanded. Because they spoke 
the language, they could be deemed a cultural community with moral 
worth. In this way, the circle was completed. The outcome of this process 
was to endow intellectuals with a particular role in the maintenance of 
language which they have never relinquished and language has acquired a 
very special quality as symbolic of the moral right to exist. 
 In other polities where political identities are less directly focused on 
language, institutions assume a larger role in the construction and mainte-
nance of identities. The civic dimension of nationhood - that which re-
flects the values of citizenship - is then easier to sustain, though ethnicity 
exists there too, as in Western Europe. But in Central and Eastern 
Europe, language has primacy. In local perceptions, the axiom is language; 
as the Hungarian writer Gyula Illyes once put it, “the nation lives in its 
language”. If there is a language, then its speakers constitute a commu-
nity; if a community has its own language, it must be a nation; and as a 
nation, it has the right to constitute its own state and become a subject 
of history. Needless to say, all the above is not much more than a le-
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gitimating formula, albeit one with extensive resonance and recognition in 
the region. 
 The legacy of this can be seen today in the determined efforts of the 
Croatian authorities to make the Croatian language as different from Ser-
bian as possible. The creation of new vocabularies is not merely the artifi-
cial crafting of new markers but is symbolic of the proposition that the 
Croatian nation has its own language and, therefore, has the moral right 
to constitute a state. 
 Language, however, is nothing like as straightforward a category as lin-
guistic nationalists, and for that matter conventional opinion, assume. Lan-
guage has to be identified, codified and imposed; diverse dialects have to 
be forged into a single standard. This is not necessarily destructive, as 
some have suggested - there is a trade-off in terms of wider comprehensi-
bility and access to a high cultural medium on the part of those whose 
linguistic competence was restricted to others speaking the same dialect. 
Thus a degree of linguistic centralisation seems the inevitable price for 
mutual comprehension and the interchangeability of skills that modernity 
demands.9 
 At the same time, though, this process of centralisation in Central and 
Eastern Europe endowed language with a symbolic as well as a functional 
role. The acquisition of the newly defined high cultural language10 is si-
multaneously a way of reproducing the moral community and the legitima-
tion of its moral worth. Hence to speak Ruritanian is effectively a duty, 
not just an everyday activity. Once a group has called its language into 
being and that move has generated a degree of resonance, the community 
can be said to have come into existence. Other political, cultural, eco-
nomic etc claims and assumptions follow on from there. Note the contin-
gent nature of language. It cannot be called into existence from nothing, 
there has to be some sociocultural basis for it, but whether a group de-
fines itself as having or not having its own language is in no way 
predetermined. 
 There are quite a few dialect groups in the region that could have 
formed the core of a high cultural language, but for contingent reasons its 
speakers would not or could not take this step (Kashub is an example). 
Thus in Central and Eastern Europe defining a language is not as simple 
as it looks with hindsight. With the exception of Polish, no language has 
a continuous high cultural tradition. There are discontinuities in the use of 
languages as effective instruments of communication matching the demands 
of modernity; hence their ability to claim the status of being a national 
language (with moral worth) was not self-evident. This was the background 
 
  9Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
  10John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1983). 
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to the language renewals or language creations of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. 
 High cultural languages are vital both instrumentally and as legitimation. 
They ensure recognition for the community that speaks it, thereby notion-
ally placing the language community beyond assimilation. It implies control 
over one's destiny, over the morality and cultural codes peculiar to the 
group that speaks it, it demarcates the group from others, it is a warning 
sign saying “keep off'. Equally, it is a guarantee of access to modernity 
and it can energise a somnolent peasant community by promising the re-
wards of wealth, status and power implicit in entry into the modern world. 
Having one's own language means that political, social, cultural and civic 
institutions can operate without interference from outside. 
 Hence the rationality of the switch by the Hungarian elite from Latin 
to Hungarian in the 19th century. On the face of it, Latin, a neutral lan-
guage under the control of the Hungarian elite, would have served the 
rulers of multi-lingual Hungary better than insisting on Magyarisation; the 
switch to Hungarian was essential to legitimate the claim to a high cul-
tural presence and modernity. Not least, Latin could not have competed 
with German, the language of Vienna. Having one's own language was 
understood as offering access to Europe, the summit of moral worth, and 
a further guarantee of cultural survival. Members of language groups who 
have never had their collective existence questioned find it extremely diffi-
cult to empathise with the fear of extinction; it is real enough as a phe-
nomenon in Central and Eastern Europe. And genocide or attempted 
genocide is not unknown either. 
 The confluence of these processes has left its mark on language in 
Central and Eastern Europe. There is, for a start, a very high level of 
linguistic intolerance in the polity, at the political level. Civic virtue is 
collapsed into cultural virtue and identified with monolingualism. Multi-lin-
gualism is understood as a weakness that potentially threatens the future 
of the community. Hence the near-desperate contests for the symbolic con-
tinuity of the language, the insistence that the national language has al-
ways been the dominant high culture medium; in practice this is expressed 
as supremacy. One state must equal one language. This bears very hard 
on ethnolinguistic minorities. 
 It is worth looking briefly at the real, as distinct from the perceived 
state of affairs in this context. A clear-sighted sociological look at ethnic 
minorities will show that while they may retain an attachment to their cul-
tures and moral regulation, where political codes are concerned, they have 
very largely accepted the patterns of the majority (which dominate the 
state). In essence, the modern, all-intrusive state has effected a very suc-
cessful integration of minorities in virtually all the areas that fall under 
the heading of citizenship. Their loyalty to the state is high and while 
that loyalty can be alienated, minorities are not inherently secessionist. In-
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deed, their attitudes towards the kin state, where other members of the 
same ethnic group live, can vary from indifference to hostility. 
 At the same time, the modern state - and that includes the highly co-
ercive communist state - has proved unable to assimilate ethnic minorities, 
once they have become conscious of their identity. Again, this proposition 
has far-reaching implications. Further attempts at linguistic assimilation are 
futile or counterproductive. Policies pursued by majorities aimed at driving 
minority languages out of existence will fail. Even when the minority is 
stripped of its intellectuals and it has no prospects for upward social mo-
bility within the ethnic group, it will not abandon its identity. From this 
perspective, majorities would do better to abandon their useless attempts 
to weaken or eliminate ethno-linguistic minorities and to concentrate on 
securing their loyalty as citizens. 
 There are countless examples to support these arguments. The Hungari-
ans of Rumania, despite very severe repression under Ceausescu, have not 
given up their Hungarian identity. The Roma, at the bottom of the social 
ladder and universally despised throughout the area, are currently looking 
to construct a new, more politicised identity - even without a shared lan-
guage. The Poles of Lithuania may have virtually no intellectuals and 
share a religion with the Lithuanian majority, yet there is no indication 
that they will abandon their Polishness. The Macedonian Slavophones of 
Greece, despite being effectively denied the most basic rights needed for 
cultural reproduction, have not disappeared. 
 All the futility of linguistic oppression demands an explanation. Again, 
it should be sought in the rationality of cultural reproduction and the per-
ception that it is gravely threatened. Each and every nation in Central 
and Eastern Europe is beset by a deep fear about its survival. They see 
threats to their existence from their neighbours and, for that matter, in 
global trends. The past - memory - is seen as malign and the future is 
potentially dark, hence the defence of the language, the “keystone of the 
nation”, is understood as a transcendental duty imposed on all members 
of the cultural community. This duty is superior to human rights, to col-
lective rights, to individual rights, to democracy, to constitutional provi-
sions, to international covenants, whatever, and it is insisted on with an 
obstinacy that only makes sense if the fear of extinction is recognised. 
 Broadly, these factors constitute the explanatory framework for why lin-
guistic coexistence at the high cultural level is so extraordinarily difficult to 
establish in Central and Eastern Europe and why seemingly simple prob-
lems acquire an apparently inexplicable and deep-rooted insolubility. What 
may seem “silly” or “tribal” to the outsider, not least the West European 
outsider, has profound meaning and resonance to the contestants, which 
no amount of mockery will wipe out or weaken. 
 The significance of these arguments is that the interaction between 
politics and culture produces a set of dynamics that have to be inter-
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preted together for the processes to make sense. The contests for lan-
guage go way beyond the immediate issues of, say, bilingual administration 
as a technical convenience for the minority; rather, a wide range of issues 
at first sight having little or nothing to do with language as such are af-
fected, bringing one community into conflict with another. 
 Take the example of minority language universities. On the face of it, 
this should be a straightforward matter of educational resources. Essen-
tially, any language community over a certain size can support higher 
education and, therefore, goes the technocratic argument, the state ought 
to make provision for it. Politico-culturally things are not as simple. It is 
not a matter of technical educational policies, but of a symbolic issue that 
the majority simply cannot accept, that the minority has intellectual aspira-
tions that might make its members fit for high office and compete in the 
world of moral values where the majority insists on exclusivity. Crucially, if 
the moral worth of the minority is accepted, its claim to participate in the 
shaping of the state is very hard to deny. The university, therefore, ac-
quires a symbolic, moral value that takes it right out of the politics of 
education. 
 Given the value attached to high culture, a university becomes the 
symbol of moral worth that a majority will do anything to deny minorities, 
because - goes the argument - in one territory only one system of moral 
regulation can exist. Besides, a group which has its separate system of 
moral-cultural regulation and moral worth will gain recognition universally 
and that, in turn, can be understood as a weakening of the integrity of 
the state. Thus it is not just education but the nature of identity that is 
at issue - the reproduction of the minority's culture and thus of its moral 
substance, as well as the people to bear it through to the next generation. 
This analysis helps to explain the obdurate refusal of, say, the Macedonian 
and the Rumanian authorities to allow the establishment of minority lan-
guage university provision for ethnic Albanians and Hungarians respectively. 
 The above analysis may sound excessively pessimistic. This need not be 
the case. It is not impossible for two or more ethno-linguistic communities 
to live together and share power in the same state. But that happy state 
of affairs requires a high degree of sensitivity towards the moral worth of 
all ethnic communities and before that comes about, they must all be 
made secure in their own future and their own unimpeded cultural 
reproduction. 
